In the previous chapter, Murray Goot argued forcefully that government in Australia does not face a ‘crisis of trust’. Using a wealth of historical data, he demonstrated that many of the bases for the crisis theory are shaky indeed. Voters are still influenced on issues by parties, they believe that the major parties are different from one another, and they are convinced that elections matter.

Yet when it comes to opinions as to the ethics and honesty of Australian politicians, or trust in the federal government, the standing of Australian politicians has clearly fallen. While many commentators may overplay the extent of the drop, the fact that it has occurred is not in question. Moreover, during the same period, confidence in government slumped in various other industrial democracies. And the trend shows little sign of abating. This has led to a burgeoning body of literature on the topic of why trust in government is falling, and what can be done to arrest the slump.

This chapter seeks to delve into that literature, with particular reference to the country where falling trust in government has been most widely discussed — the United States. I outline seven hypotheses that have been propounded to explain declining trust in political leaders, and consider whether they can help us understand changing attitudes to Australian politicians. Having reviewed each of these theories, I consider another aspect of trust: whether declining trust in politicians affects both sides of politics equally, or whether it shapes not only the way in which politics is practised, but also the policies that may be implemented.

**Explaining the general reduction in trust**

The most reliable data on attitudes towards Australian politicians is found in the Morgan Poll data on how various occupations are rated for ethics and honesty. This survey — conducted in 1976, 1979, 1981, and annually since 1983 — provides not only a means of observing opinions on federal and state politicians, but also of comparing those with other occupational groups.

Ideally, one would want polling data on the direct question of the trustworthiness of politicians. As Goot has shown, however, we lack surveys that are specific to one tier of government, and for which the question and possible responses have not changed over the years. In my view, therefore, the answers to the Morgan ‘ethics and honesty’ poll are the best available proxy for trust in Australian politicians. I will therefore refer to the results of this poll as representing the level of ‘trust’ in government.
Figure 2.1 shows the results of the survey. As can be seen, the trend is steadily downwards. Indeed, over a 24-year interval, there is only one instance in which trust rises in two successive years. It is also interesting to note that ratings for state and federal politicians do not differ by any significant amount. Australians do not appear to perceive any systemic difference in the trustworthiness of their elected representatives at the state and federal level.

**Figure 2.1 Public perceptions about the ethics and honesty of Australian politicians**

![Graph showing public perceptions about the ethics and honesty of Australian politicians]

Note: Interviewees were asked how they would rate or score various professions for honesty and ethical standards — very high, high, average, low or very low. The percentage shown above is the proportion who gave politicians a ‘high’ or ‘very high’ rating.

[Source: Roy Morgan, 2000]

In the United States, the best figures on trust in government come from the American National Election Studies, dating back to 1958 (see Figure 2.2). Two differences from the Australian data are immediately apparent. First, the main change in the US data occurred from 1964 to 1980, when the proportion of Americans saying that they could trust their federal government ‘to do what is right’ most or all of the time fell from 76 to 25 per cent. The sheer magnitude of this drop dwarfs any trend in the Australian data. Unfortunately, without any pre-1976 figures for Australia, it is impossible to know if a similar trend occurred Down Under. Secondly, since 1976, perceptions of the honesty and ethical standards of Australian politicians has fallen, while trust in the US Federal Government has fluctuated — increasing from 1980 to 1984 and from 1994 to 1998, and remaining static or falling between these two intervals. Thus while it is true to say that there has been an overall decline in trust in the federal government in both countries, the time frames in which the decline occurs do not often coincide.
Figure 2.2  Trust in government — the United States

![Graph showing trust in government over time](image)

Note: Respondents were asked ‘How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right — just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?’ The percentage listed above is those respondents who answered ‘just about always’ or ‘most of the time’.

[Source: Center for Political Studies, 2000.]

Notwithstanding these differences, there is evidence that trust in national governments has declined worldwide in the past few decades. Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000) find that trust in politicians had fallen in eleven out of twelve of the nations they survey\(^2\) — with many of the declines dating back to the 1970s, and some to the 1960s. The fact that the pattern of the decline differs between countries should not lead us to reject explanations that have cross-national potency.

Why trust in politicians is declining throughout much of the developed world remains a puzzle. No single explanation seems to be satisfactory. Some are more easily testable, while others make greater intuitive sense. The seven major explanations for the phenomenon are reviewed below.

1. The World War II effect
   One theory is that rather than asking why trust in government is declining now, we should instead be asking why it was so high after World War II. According to Joseph Nye (1997), the success of government in winning the war gave rise to a faith in government, which endured through the 1950s and early 1960s, only to be dashed when the civil rights challenges of the 1960s and the economic problems of the 1970s came to the fore.

   Unfortunately, in the absence of reliable pre–World War II data on trust in government for either Australia or the United States, it is impossible to properly test this theory. Moreover, even if trust did peak after the war, this is at best a partial explanation, as it fails to account for the further decline that took place during the 1960s and 1970s (in the US) and the 1980s and 1990s (in Australia).
2. Poor leadership
Orren (1997) posits that the quality of leadership plays a substantial role in trust. He argues that the calibre of today’s political leaders is substantially inferior to those who ran for office in the early days of the American republic. Back then, voters had the opportunity to elect individuals such as George Washington, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. In comparison, Orren argues that the turmoil associated with the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon was responsible for the fact that trust in the US fell by a massive 40 per cent during the ten years from 1964 to 1974 (1997: 80).

Again, the absence of data prevents us from being able to test Orren’s contention that past US leaders engendered a higher degree of trust than their modern-day successors. Even if such data existed, it could be argued that the reason particular leaders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries appear so impressive in hindsight has more to do with the nature of modern-day politics than their personal qualities. Not only has media scrutiny dramatically increased, but public policy-making has arguably become more difficult. Johnson’s unpopularity at the end of his term perhaps had less to do with his leadership than with external factors that prevented him winning either his war against Vietnam or against poverty.

What can be said about Australian political leadership? First, that three of the four prime ministers who have served since 1976 presided over a decline in public perceptions of federal politicians. The rating of federal politicians for ethics and honesty when Malcolm Fraser came to office was 19 per cent, but the average over the course of his prime ministership was just 17 per cent; Bob Hawke had an average rating of 15 per cent, Paul Keating had an average of 10 per cent, and John Howard has had an average rating of 11 per cent (Roy Morgan, 2000). While Howard appears to be the only leader who has improved perceptions of politicians, it must also be noted that the figure fell to an all-time low (7 per cent) during his first term. Though opinions differ on the leadership qualities of these four men, few would argue that as a group they were of a lower calibre than any other four successive Australian prime ministers. Given this, it seems improbable that a general decline in the quality of our political leaders can account for the drop in perceptions of politicians.

3. The removal of incumbent governments
In his chapter, Goot emphasised the positive impact that a change in government has on public opinion about politicians, confidence in government, and trust in government. This ‘honeymoon’ effect can be seen in Figure 2.3, which graphs the proportion of people who believe that politicians are ethical and honest, with arrows marking the point at which the party in power federally changed. Interestingly, the effect appears not only to apply to federal politicians, but also to their state counterparts.
Figure 2.3 Changes in government and perceptions about Australian politicians

Note: Interviewees were asked how they would rate or score various professions for honesty and ethical standards — very high, high, average, low or very low. The percentage shown above is the proportion who gave politicians a ‘high’ or ‘very high’ rating.

[Source: Roy Morgan, 2000]

Regression analysis confirms that changes in government have a statistically significant effect on the public standing of politicians. On average, a change in the governing party at the federal level boosts the rating of both federal and state politicians by between 4 and 5 percentage points. This effect becomes slightly smaller (but more statistically significant) if one controls for changes in the ethical standing of all occupations, by substituting the absolute rating of politicians for their rating relative to all occupational groups.

Interestingly, in the United States, a change in the party holding the presidency does not have any significant effect on trust in the federal government. As shown in Figure 2.4, of the five instances between 1958 and 1998 in which the party holding the presidency changed, only two (John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960 and Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980) were followed by an upturn in the proportion of people who trusted the federal government. In part, this is probably explained by the fact that a change in the party holding the presidency does not generally coincide with a change in the majority party in Congress.
While changing the governing party cannot be a long-term solution to the problem of trust, it does appear that long governing spells depress overall perceptions of the ethics and honesty of politicians. Moreover, a change in government at the federal level flows through to provide a boost to the public’s opinion of state politicians.

4. Economic growth
A substantial amount of literature exists to show that when economic growth is high, voters are more likely to re-elect their politicians. But does strong economic growth also lead voters to have more trust in their politicians?

At first blush, the theory seems dubious. Certainly, there is no correlation between the Morgan Poll data on public perception of Australian politicians (which has trended downwards for the past quarter-century) and GDP growth rates (which have fluctuated). The same is true of analogous data in the United States. Yet if we approach the problem from a different perspective, and compare the rates of growth and confidence in one’s government, there appears to be a strong correlation between the two variables.
The cross-national data is from the 1995 World Values Survey, which asked residents of 42 nations an identical question: how satisfied were they with their national politicians?\(^7\) When their answers are regressed against the level of economic growth in those countries, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between the two.\(^8\) This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.5.

**Figure 2.5 Economic growth and satisfaction with government across 42 countries, 1995**

Note: Respondents were asked: ‘How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?’ The above graph represents the percentage of people who answered ‘very satisfied’ or ‘fairly satisfied’.

[Sources: Inglehart et al., 2000 (for polling data); World Bank, 2000 (for growth rates)]

The most plausible explanation for why the relationship between growth and trust shows up in cross-national data, and not in time-series data, is that both are dependent on the quality of governmental institutions. Those countries with low GDP growth rates and low trust tend to be in Africa and Eastern Europe, whereas the region with the highest rates of growth and trust is Western Europe. A strong public service, the absence of corruption, and free elections may well boost both growth and trust. If this theory is correct, then each country’s political institutions lead to a base level of trust, from which other factors then cause trust to fluctuate.

Among Australians, the level of confidence in government (44.8 per cent) places the country in the top one-third of the sample. This level is also higher than the Australian growth rate for 1995 (4 per cent) would predict. Australians’ confidence in their politicians may be declining, but by world standards, they still hold their leaders in relatively high esteem.
5. Declining interpersonal trust

Another possible theory for the fall in trust is that it is related to an overall decline in interpersonal trust. Brehm and Rahn (1997) contend that if people have faith in one another, they will extend this trust to the political system. In contrast, Uslaner (2000) argues that trust in government depends far more on factors particular to the political system than on the extent to which one trusts other people.

In the United States, the suggestion that interpersonal trust and trust in politicians are related seems to gain some support from data showing that the proportion of high-school seniors who agree that most people can be trusted has been falling since 1975 (Smith, 1997). Indeed, Francis Fukuyama (1999) uses this data to argue that a ‘great disruption’ occurred in the United States in the 1960s, causing not only a fall in interpersonal trust, but also a rise in crime and the breakdown of the traditional family unit.

In Australia, however, the historical data on interpersonal trust is more limited. The only relevant polls I have been able to locate are from the World Values Survey, conducted in 1983 (as the Australian Values Study) and 1995. A sample of Australians were asked: ‘Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ In 1983, 49 per cent agreed that ‘most people can be trusted’; in 1995, the proportion saying ‘most people can be trusted’ had fallen to 40 per cent (Inglehart et al., 2000).

This 9 per cent decline in interpersonal trust neatly paralleled the 10 per cent fall (from 19 to 9 per cent) in the proportion of people who believed that federal politicians were ethical and honest. Of course, correlation does not imply causality. But it is difficult to accept Kenneth Newton’s (1999) suggestion that the causation could be running in the opposite direction — that trust in politicians (‘political capital’) might affect social capital. The factors generally cited for changing levels of social capital are meta-forces — the ageing of the ‘civic generation’ born in the 1920s and 1930s, increasing television viewing and longer working hours. In the face of such tectonic shifts, it seems unlikely that attitudes to politicians and government played much of a part in changing the way in which we interact with and trust one another.

On the other hand, there are a variety of mechanisms through which social capital could conceivably affect one’s attitudes to government. Robert Putnam (1993) found that when regional governments were established in Italy in the 1970s, those areas that had the highest numbers of local clubs and associations were those in which government was most effective and most popular. Since regional government had not existed before, it was in a sense a perfect experiment; social capital could only have been affecting government, not the other way around.

In the United States, Putnam has since concluded that states with the highest levels of social capital have the best rates of tax compliance, even controlling for other differences (2000: 347). Such states are also unusually innovative in public policy. Moreover, regions with more social capital have higher levels of grassroots involvement in politics, which flows through to greater levels of support for and trust in municipal government.
In the case of Australia, the case for a decline in social capital has not yet been made as forcefully as it has in the United States (though see Latham, 1997; Cox, 1998). Yet it seems perfectly conceivable that an ageing civic generation, more television viewing and longer working hours might have also diminished Australian levels of social capital and interpersonal trust, as reflected in the findings of the 1983 and 1995 World Values Surveys. If this is so, then those who seek to boost the standing of politicians may find that they need to focus on the larger question of social capital.

6. Declining respect for hierarchical institutions
A somewhat different explanation for the decline in trust stems from Ronald Inglehart’s suggestion that falling trust is linked to the trend towards postmaterialist values (1997b). This explanation helps to indicate why trust in politicians has been falling across a range of countries, and why trust in a variety of hierarchical institutions has diminished. Political parties are traditionally organised along class lines, and as materialist politics become less important to many voters, one might well expect that trust in existing political parties would fall.

The trend towards postmaterialist values in Australia has mirrored a global shift. Australians are now less concerned with issues of economic and physical security, and more focused on freedom, self-expression and improving the quality of their lives (Inglehart & Abramson, 1995; Inglehart, 1997a; see also Tanner, 1999: 24, 193).

Figure 2.6 Public perceptions of various occupational groups

Notes: Interviewees were asked how they would rate or score various professions for honesty and ethical standards — very high, high, average, low or very low. The percentage shown above is the proportion who gave each occupational group a ‘high’ or ‘very high’ rating.

‘All other occupations’ is the mean score for twelve occupational groups: doctors, dentists, police, school teachers, university lecturers, lawyers, bank managers, business executives, union leaders, advertising people, newspaper journalists and car salesmen.

[Source: Roy Morgan, 2000]
The theory that all hierarchical institutions have experienced a decline in trust is tested in Figure 2.6, which sets public perceptions of politicians against perceptions of other occupations. According to Goot (quoting Eckersley, 1998: 9), the declining ratings for ethics and honesty have affected most those ‘who wield financial and political power and influence’ — lawyers, journalists and politicians. However, another plausible explanation is that the trend is most pronounced for those in hierarchical institutions. Indeed, one could make a case that the closest occupation to politicians is indeed business executives (since police and bank managers may be seen as performing more functional roles). If so, the degree of fit between perceptions of business executives and perceptions of politicians is quite striking — providing perhaps the strongest evidence in favour of Inglehart’s theory.

If one accepts that the rise in postmaterialist values is a substantial cause of declining confidence in politicians, it would also be reasonable to expect that as parties focus more on postmaterialist issues, trust will rise. The Third Way, Compassionate Conservatism and green politics all represent a trend away from the politics of class and towards the politics of identity. It remains to be seen whether they will be associated with a rise in the level of trust in politicians.

7. The media
While overly critical commentary may diminish trust in politicians, we need to be careful to separate this from the role of the media as bearers of bad news. Several commentators are careful to make this distinction, noting systematic ways in which political reporting has changed over the past few decades. For example, Thomas Patterson (1993) groups the changes in the way politics is reported into three main categories — arguing that it has become more negative, more focused on conflict than substance, and more journalist-centred. In Orren’s words:

Over the years, both print and television have shifted to a more interpretive, evaluative style of reporting. More and more, news stories seek to explain the inner workings of political leaders, their motives and intentions. This type of coverage focuses alternately on strategy and tactics (‘inside baseball’), the leaders’ missteps (‘gotcha journalism’), or what the news ‘really means’. Invariably, though, the interpretation and commentary presumes to lift the curtain on the wizard and reveal the charlatan behind it. (1997: 98)

Of course, political parties themselves are far from blameless for these developments. Although negative advertising is not a new invention, its use has certainly expanded over the past few decades. Moreover, its undeniable effectiveness means that it is likely to endure in the future, notwithstanding portents of its demise (Morris, 1999). Similarly, much of political spin-doctoring (which came into prominence in the 1980s and 1990s) helped sustain the media’s focus on strategy and tactics. Yet changes in reporting — particularly through the medium of television — have played an important part in lowering the public’s perceptions of politicians.
The partisan dimension

The conventional view of trust and politics is epitomised by former opposition leader John Hewson’s description of falling trust in politicians as ‘a plague on both our houses’ (ABC, 1990). Poor public perceptions of the political elite are generally regarded as a problem that affects all politicians and political parties equally.

Yet it need not necessarily be the case that changing levels of trust have an equal effect on both political parties. One alternative hypothesis is that because parties of the left are more committed to maintaining governmental institutions and an active role for the state in the economy, lower levels of trust will have a more adverse effect on them than on parties of the right.

For this theory to hold, voters’ attitudes towards politicians and parliament would need to be somehow linked to their views on other institutions of government. On its face, this seems perfectly reasonable — even if citizens have a more benign view of the local social security office than their local member of parliament, they probably do not view the two as disconnected. Moreover, political institutions are, self-evidently, at the apex of government, a point that is routinely reinforced by the media. It seems reasonable to think that assessments of politicians might therefore inform the electorate’s opinions of other governmental institutions (Hetherington, 1998: 793). The theory also gains some credence from Fukuyama’s finding that higher levels of trust in government tend to be correlated with higher rates of government expenditure and more activist state sectors (1999: 56).

What does the data say? It is true that during the period since the 1970s, traditional social democracy was increasingly challenged by free-market philosophies, particularly the rise of Reaganism and Thatcherism. The ideas of free-market advocates Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, previously peripheral to mainstream political debates, became a force to be reckoned with in the industrialised democracies. In the same interval, and in many of the same countries, trust in government fell. But establishing a causal link between these two phenomena would be an enormously difficult exercise — if not an impossible one — given the many external factors that impacted on both of them.

The alternative is to turn to the polling data. Unfortunately, since surveys on trust do not generally also ask respondents their party affiliation, we cannot easily determine the relationship between the two. We do know, however, that there is a correlation between voters’ ‘confidence in the … government’ and their views on the politicians themselves, as measured by whether they believe politicians are ethical and honest, and on whether ‘the people in government can be trusted to do the right thing’. As Goot’s data show, these three indices have steadily declined over the past two decades, and each tend to rise slightly after a change in the governing party at the federal level.

A conclusive answer to the question will probably have to await better survey data. But this should not stop us from asking the speculative question: if trust in government did have an unequal effect on the major political parties, what implications would this have?
First, cynicism towards politicians may well lead voters to question whether government is an effective engine for solving society’s problems. Social democratic parties might find that in a low-trust environment, there is less support for interventionist economic policies. Secondly, the electorate may also become more receptive to minimising government through privatisation, deregulation, cutting welfare and lowering taxes. Thirdly, if distrust in government flows through to a desire for smaller government, then particularly low levels of trust could lead to antipolitics — the belief that politics is harmful, or at least redundant, because most problems are not collective, but can be solved spontaneously by the people involved (Schedler, 1997: 4–5). Antipolitics is born of the view that society is essentially self-regulating, and that politics is an improper interference into private lives. According to Geoff Mulgan, antipolitics seeks to promote market competition and minimise state intervention into the economy (1994: 26).

Can political leaders of the right use this to their advantage? Some argue that this was exactly the goal of Ronald Reagan, who stated in his 1981 inaugural address: ‘Government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem.’ During the late 1980s, as Reagan continued to criticise the institution of government, Americans’ faith in their politicians and their political institutions fell to a new low. It is hard to imagine that this did not implicitly boost the Republican Party’s strong anti-government agenda.

Conclusion
Just as Goot has cautioned that the decline in politicians’ standing for ethics and honesty should not be taken as evidence of a ‘crisis’ of trust, I would warn against accepting any single explanation for the phenomenon. No one factor has caused trust to wane, and for those who seek to boost the standing of politicians, no ‘silver bullet’ solution exists. Of the seven hypotheses canvassed in this chapter, the most persuasive are falling interpersonal trust, a trend towards postmaterialist values and the changing role of the media. In addition, since changes in government seem to boost trust, long spells of incumbency must also play a factor. The cross-national data also seems to suggest that a country’s economic growth — probably closely related to its political and economic institutions — affects the degree to which voters trust their politicians.

The final issue is whether trust in politicians has a partisan dimension. On this, I conclude that while there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that falling levels of trust in government affect voters’ attitudes to governmental institutions, the theory has some intuitive plausibility. Indeed, it might be thought surprising if levels of trust in politicians were entirely unrelated to one’s attitude towards government intervention in the economy.

NOTES
1 I am grateful to Louise Biggs for her comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
2 Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000) find that trust in politicians has fallen in the United States, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Austria, Denmark and Finland, and risen in the Netherlands.
3 The data for Fraser covers 1976–81 (since the 1983 poll was taken after the election), the data for Hawke covers the period 1983–91 (since the transition to Keating occurred after the poll), the data for Keating
covers 1992–95 (since the 1996 poll was taken after the election), and the data for Howard covers 1996 onwards.

4 A change in the governing party at the federal level boosts trust in federal politicians by an average of 4.50 per cent, with a standard error of 1.87 per cent, and an $R^2$ of 0.22 (statistically significant at the 5 per cent level). Such a change also boosts trust in state politicians by an average of 4.94 per cent, with a standard error of 2.57 per cent, and an $R^2$ of 0.21 (statistically significant at the 10 per cent level). In each case, the regression is based on 21 elections.

5 The relative figures are calculated on the basis of the gap between the level of trust in politicians (state or federal, as the case may be) and the mean level of trust for twelve other occupational groups (doctors, dentists, police, school teachers, university lecturers, lawyers, bank managers, business executives, union leaders, advertising people, newspaper journalists and car salesmen). A change in the governing party at the federal level boosts trust in federal politicians, relative to other occupations, by an average of 4.34 per cent, with a standard error of 1.36 per cent, and an $R^2$ of 0.29 (statistically significant at the 1 per cent level). Such a change also boosts trust in state politicians, relative to other occupations, by an average of 4.79 per cent, with a standard error of 2.04 per cent, and an $R^2$ of 0.26 (statistically significant at the 1 per cent level). In each case, $N = 21$. Both regressions are robust to heteroskedacity.

6 Since the early 1980s, most political scientists seem to have accepted the proposition that the strength of the economy affects electoral outcomes. The initial research focused on House of Representatives elections (Stigler, 1973; Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1984), then broadened to encompass US presidential polls (Hibbs, 1982a; Markus, 1988) and elections in other industrialised nations (Hibbs, 1982b; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Schneider and Frey, 1988; Nadeau and Blais, 1993).

7 Unfortunately, it is not possible to make comparisons with earlier World Values Surveys, since 1995 is the only year in which such a question has been asked.

8 Taking trust as the dependent variable, the coefficient for growth is 1.530867 (with a standard error of 0.5518637). This is significant at the 1 per cent level. $N = 42$. Adjusted $R^2 = 0.14$.

9 I take ‘social capital’ here to mean social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam, 2000: 19).

10 Note in particular that the ratings for both business executives and politicians dip in 1985 and 1991, and rise in 1999.

11 William Gamson explains this on the basis that trust is ‘the creator of collective power’ (Gamson, 1968: 42).

12 For example, in opening a Chicago press conference on 12 August 1986, Reagan said ‘The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, “I’m from the government and I’m here to help.”’